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Abstract
Blockchains oer a useful abstraction: a trustworthy, de-
centralized log of totally ordered transactions. Traditional
blockchains have problems with scalability and eciency,
preventing their use for many applications. ese limita-
tions arise from the requirement that all participants agree
on the total ordering of transactions. To address this funda-
mental shortcoming, we introduce Charloe, a system for
maintaining decentralized, authenticated data structures, in-
cluding transaction logs. Each data structure—indeed, each
block—species its own availability and integrity properties,
allowing Charloe applications to retain the full benets of
permissioned or permissionless blockchains. In Charloe, a
block can be atomically appended to multiple logs, allowing
applications to be interoperable when they want to, without
ineciently forcing all applications to share one big log. We
call this open graph of interconnected blocks a blockweb.
We allow new kinds of blockweb applications that operate
beyond traditional chains. We demonstrate the viability of
Charloe applications with proof-of-concept servers run-
ning interoperable blockchains. Using performance data
from our prototype, we estimate that when compared with
traditional blockchains, Charloe oers multiple orders of
magnitude improvement in speed and energy eciency.
1 Introduction
Blockchains are distributed, append-only logs used to lend
availability, accountability, and consistency to everything
from marketplaces [53] and supply chains [31] to health
records [44] and governance [66]. Despite their popularity,
blockchain-based applications suer from a fundamental lack
of scalability [18]. Interacting applications must be on the
Technical Report, Cornell University
2018. . . .$15.00
DOI:
same chain, with all their operations both stored and totally
ordered by a global mechanism. Fully serialized blockchains
are not truly scalable: each consensus mechanism has some
maximum speed, regardless of the number of participating
machines [18, 40, 50]. As a result, popular chains like Bit-
coin [52] and Ethereum are overburdened [29, 37].
We present Charloe, a framework for applications built
on the blockweb, a novel generalization of blockchains. e
blockweb is an authenticated directed acyclic graph [45] of
all Charloe blocks. Whereas blockchains enforce a total
ordering on all data, a blockweb requires ordering only when
one block references another. Applications can thus create
an ordering in the blocks they use, but blocks are by de-
fault unordered. is is a natural extension of the database
community’s decades old “least ordering” ideal [12].
Reduced serialization requirements make Charloe funda-
mentally more ecient. For example, a transaction moving
money between bank accounts need only be serialized rela-
tive to other transactions on those accounts. Bitcoin’s global
serialization mechanism takes about an hour [18], but with
Charloe, transactions can be fast enough to buy a coee,
without resorting to o-chain transactions seled later. Even
when operating largely in parallel, we discuss how applica-
tions can preserve the serializability properties of traditional
blockchains while executing multi-chain transactions, using
recursive aestations and meets (§ 4).
Charloe allows applications to reference each other’s
blocks, and even to share blocks. For example, our time-
stamping application (§ 5.4) reads existing blocks and ref-
erences them with timestamp blocks, demonstrating that
each referenced block existed before a given time. Blocks
from any other application can be sent to the timestamping
servers, without slowing down the application.
Beyond excessive serialization, another problem is that
existing blockchains treat all blocks the same way. ey
have one mechanism for selecting and storing all blocks.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
6.
06
97
8v
1 
 [c
s.D
C]
  1
8 J
un
 20
18
Technical Report, 15 June 2018, Cornell University Isaac She, Xinwen Wang, Andrew C. Myers, and Robbert van Renesse
Unfortunately, no single mechanism suits every application.
In an aempt to create consensus mechanisms trustworthy
enough for every possible application, existing blockchains
have become slow and inecient [18, 20]. With Charloe,
applications specify requirements for their own blocks.
In Charloe, data structures are subsets of the blocks in
the blockweb, dened by aestations found in each block ref-
erence. As each block is an immutable datum, and references
others by hash, blocks form an authenticated directed acyclic
graph [33]. However, some applications require more con-
straints on their data structures. us each block reference
may include signed certicates demonstrating that it belongs
in a given data structure. ese may include proofs of retriev-
ability, demonstrating that it was stored properly, as well
as proofs of integrity, demonstrating that some application-
specic set of servers believe the block belongs in a data
structure. For instance, a payment log includes only blocks
approved by the payer and requires a total ordering of pay-
ments, to protect against double spending. Depending on
the application, its data structures may be permissioned, per-
missionless, or both [15]. One advantage of Charloe is that
principals (or machines) that an application does not trust
cannot inuence the application’s data structures.
With availability and integrity aestations, Charloe sep-
arates two duties which traditional blockchains conate:
storing blocks, and approving which blocks belong in a struc-
ture [47]. Charloe servers providing storage provide proofs
of availability without having to worry about ordering or
data structures, and servers providing integrity need not
even read whole blocks, streamlining consensus. ese
laer servers correspond to consensus servers in a tradi-
tional blockchain, also called “orderers” or “miners” [47]. As
we have named our framework aer the book Charloe’s
Web, availability servers are called Wilbur, aer the character
whose goal is to stay alive, and integrity servers are called
Fern, aer the character who makes dicult choices [67].
Contributions
• In §3, we present Charloe, a blockweb, which allows
any application or server to participate concurrently.
• In § 4, we discuss the properties of information in
Charloe, including requirements on how blocks are
referenced (§ 4.1) and the resulting properties of blockchains
within Charloe (§ 4.3).
• In §5, we explain how Charloe’s exibility gener-
alizes existing designs (§ 5.1) and how new kinds of
applications can be built eciently in Charloe.
• In §6, we describe our prototype implementation.
• In §7, we use this implementation, and real Bitcoin
data to compare the eciency of Charloe to that of
other blockchain systems.
2 Supply Chain: A Running Example
Suppose a variety of companies want to agree on the his-
tory of ownership, including trades and purchases, of the
goods they use. ey might want to ensure, for example, that
the provenance of an item, or that a limited quantity was
produced. [31] A blockchain provides immutability: each
record contains a digest, and thus a commitment, of all the
records on which it depends. If a user possesses a record,
they can detect any aempted alterations to earlier records.
Blockchains also provide availability: each record is tradi-
tionally replicated with each “miner,” and so it is dicult to
lose commied records.
It is possible to track supply chains on existing blockchains,
such as Ethereum, that are intended for use as application
platforms [24]. However, all such platforms use a single
chain to track all records. is requires that all records be
totally serialized, even when unnecessary. For instance, if
one blockchain tracks ownership of coffee, and another
tracks ownership of diamonds, then they should be able
to operate mostly in parallel. A sudden urry of coffee
trades should not normally slow down trading diamonds.
With a single blockchain, however, that’s exactly what would
happen: trades compete to append their transactions to the
chain [29]. is unnecessary ordering may seem minor, but
with millions of potential transactions every second, even
the fastest consensus systems cannot keep up.
One key insight is that the mechanism for commit-
ting a block need not satisfy everyone: just the those
involved in the block itself. Charloe instead allows inde-
pendent operations on independent servers to simply ignore
each other. If Alice wants to trade art to Bob in exchange
for bricks, then any mechanism that both Alice and Bob
nd agreeable is sucient to commit a block representing
such a trade. For example, they might agree on some con-
sortium of servers who can atomically commit the block
into their supply chain records. If another trade, featuring
dierent commodities and dierent principals, agrees on
some unrelated mechanism, there is no harm in those trades
proceeding concurrently.
Intuitively, the supply chain system needs:
• A way for Alice and Bob to state their requirements,
in terms of who they trust to guarantee the unique-
ness of art and bricks sales, and in terms of where
such records must be stored.
• A way for those authorities and storage servers to
sign o on such a transaction.
• A way for future transactions to reference this one,
carrying aestations of uniqueness and availability.
In a trade, each party may ask for records of the history
of ownership of the other party’s holdings. If the owner-
ship ancestry records provided by each party are not up to
the other’s satisfaction, they will need to get their records
endorsed by a suciently trustworthy party. Records can
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Figure 1. Bob buys art from Alice, and the record of the
sale is a block, B. e rst trade is tracked by the AAA, but
Bob later wishes to prove ownership to Carol, who does
not trust the AAA, and so they get the CCC to endorse the
earlier transaction.
Client
Time
Wilbur Servers Fern Servers
block
label
aestation of
availability
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of integrity
reference
Figure 2. Life of a Block
increase in integrity and availability as more participants
agree to store them, or agree to reject conicting records.
Suppose that Bob buys some art from Alice, as depicted
in Figure 1. To ensure the authenticity of the art, they atom-
ically commit the change of art ownership with the Amer-
ican Art Authority (AAA), a network of art-tracking
servers. Bob then has an aestation demonstrating that he
owns the art, in the eyes of the AAA.
Suppose that Bob later wishes to sell the art to Carol.
Naturally, the record of the new transaction should refer-
ence the record of the previous transaction (with Alice and
Bob), to show a history of ownership. However, Carol does
not trust the AAA to maintain art ownership records. She
only trusts the Canadian Craft Consortium (CCC), a dif-
ferent network of art-tracking servers. erefore, before
their trade can proceed, they send the record of the previous
transaction to the CCC. If the CCC sees no conicts, it adds
it to its records, and replies with an aestation to that aect.
en Carol can recognize that Bob owns the art.
Another key insight is that endorsement is the same
as signing o on transactions in the rst place. e
type of aeststion the CCC provides is no dierent from the
aestation the AAA provides.
3 Design
Charloe provides a framework for distributed applications
to build their own data structures within the blockweb. Our
design is motivated by the following principles:
• We should not force unnecessary ordering: applica-
tions that do not interact should run concurrently.
Key (root hash)
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Figure 3. Structure of an Example Block
• Storing blocks and choosing which ones belong in
which data structures should be separate duties, per-
formed by separate servers.
• Incentives should be le to applications: servers can
aest to any blocks they wish, for whatever reason.
• When reading a data structure, it should be possible
to know the inherent trust assumptions: Under what
conditions will this data remain available? When
might someone read conicting data?
• Data should always be able to become more trustwor-
thy, and more available, but never less so.
ere are two types of servers in Charloe: Wilbur avail-
ability servers are key-value stores which store blocks, and
Fern integrity servers aest to which blocks belong in which
data structures. Together, these servers provide the block-
web: a decentralized data structure with many smaller data
structures within it. Applications dene the structures they
wish to work with, and most importantly, specify who must
aest to blocks in those structures. ese specications ef-
fectively dene the application’s failure assumptions: if the
application only species one specic server on which to
store a block, it assumes that server won’t crash. Minting a
block within an application involves creating a block with
whatever data the application uses, and then sending it to
servers that work with the application, so they can aest
that it is stored, and that they will not aest to conicting
blocks. is process is shown in Figure 2. Anyone reading
the set of suciently available blocks and selecting those
with the appropriate aestations will see all the blocks cre-
ated for a given application (unless that application’s failure
assumptions were wrong).
3.1 Structure of a Block
Each block is a Merkle Tree [48]. ere are three leaf types:
• Payload leaves are application-specic data.
• Reference leaves identify another block, and provide
aestations as to where the block is stored, and what
data structures include it (§ 3.1.1).
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Figure 4. Structure of an Example Block Reference
• Label leaves describe where this block should be stored,
what data structures it must be a part of, and who
must approve its membership in those data struc-
tures (§ 3.1.2).
Our implementation species the data layout of references
and labels (§ 6). e root hash of the tree is used as the key,
or unique identier, of the block. Merkle proofs can demon-
strate the presence of a label or reference in a block [48].
Figure 3 shows an example of a block.
Charloe provides a data format for blocks and for refer-
ences to blocks. is structure is agnostic to implementation-
specic details such as hash functions and digital signature
formats, so servers can specify the formats they use.
3.1.1 Attestations
Each aestation is a promise. Wilbur servers create availabil-
ity aestations which promise to store a block. Fern servers
create integrity aestations which promise not to aest to
conicting blocks. Aestations can serve as part of evidence
of wrongdoing, supporting applications’ incentive systems.
Since aestations cannot be created until aer the block
is formed (for instance, a Wilbur server cannot store a block
until aer the block exists), aestations for a block cannot be
stored in the block itself. erefore, each reference to a block
must include any relevant aestations. If a block references
its predecessor in a chain, for example, it includes aestations
demonstrating that the predecessor is suciently well stored,
and uniquely occupies the previous chain slot.
Any reference to a block should demonstrate that at least
the block’s own label is satised. erefore, a reference to
a block should include a copy of the label, and a Merkle
proof that the label corresponds to the block’s root hash.
Additional aestations may bolster the block’s demonstrated
availability and integrity. Figure 4 shows an example of a
block reference.
Availability Aestations are issued by Wilbur servers.
One type, which we have implemented in our prototype,
is a signed promise to store a block forever. Charloe is
extensible with respect to proof types, so other types, such
as proofs of retrievability [14], may be added by any servers
that support them.
Integrity Aestations are issued by Fern servers. For ex-
ample, if a Fern server in our supply chain application aests
to a block stating that Alice sold a specic unit of art to
Bob, the Fern server will not aest to any other blocks in
which Alice sells that unit of art. One type of aestation,
found in our prototype implementation, is a proof of consen-
sus (§3.2). Consensus participants aest that they will not
consent to conicting blocks. All messages in the consensus
are signed, and the proof is a collection of the messages sent
while achieving consensus. Other conceivable integrity aes-
tations include proofs of work. Unlike a proof of consensus,
where the underlying assumption is that a certain portion
of the participants are honest, the underlying assumption
of a proof of work aestation is that no more hashpower
has been used on a dierent block. When looking at all the
blocks in a proof of work chain, the most trustworthy at-
testations are those demonstrating the most hashpower has
been applied to a block (or its descendants). is is a natural
implementation of the longest chain rule [52].
The Charloe framework is extensible: aestations are a
tagged union type, so anyone can add application-specic
aestation types as long as their servers know what to do
with them. In general, not all servers support all proof types.
Applications must be engineered only to ask for proofs from
servers that can provide them. Our prototype implementa-
tion supports queries and error messages for discovery of
available proof types.
Semantically, data of type τ are availability aestations if
τ denes a unique function ατ from a τ to a set of sets of
Wilbur servers:
ατ : τ → 2(2W )
(whereW is the set of all Wilbur servers) e aestation A
must hold so long as one of the sets in ατ (A) is composed of
Wilbur servers who are all behaving correctly.
Suppose a client has an aestation A, and queries one
Wilbur server from each set in ατ (A). If all the Wilbur servers
respond “block not found,” then the client has proof of an
aestation violation: no set in ατ (A) is composed entirely
of correct servers. Denial-of-service aacks in which the
server simply does not respond are also possible, although
there is work in creating proofs of those as well [28].
Data of type τ are integrity aestations if τ denes two
unique functions cτ and ατ of types:
cτ : (τ × τ ′) → Boolean ατ : τ → 2(2F )
(where τ ′ is a type of aestation, and F is the set of all Fern
servers) e function cτ denes which aestations conict
with an aestation, and ατ denes the set of universes (in
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terms of which Fern Servers are trustworthy) in which an
aestation is safe.
Suppose aestation A is of type τ , and aestation A′, of
type τ ′, conicts with A. By denition, this means that
cτ (A,A′) = True . e pair (A,A′) constitutes a proof that
every set of Fern servers in ατ (A) contains a byzantine server.
We call aestation A stronger than aestation A′ when A
conicts with a superset of the aestations A′ conicts with,
and A holds whenever A′ holds:
∀x .cτ (A,x) ⇒ cτ (A′,x) ατ (A′) ⊆ ατ (A)
Correct servers do not issue aestations that conict with
aestations that others might make. For instance, our proof
of consensus aestations are constructed so that byzantine
failures too weak to inuence the consensus that created
that aestation cannot create conicting aestations.
3.1.2 Labels
Each block contains exactly one label leaf. is leaf describes
which data structures the block is meant to be a part of, and
what is necessary for its approval. Specically, a label de-
scribes the least strong aestations a block requires. In some
sense, if aestations are never created satisfying the block’s
label, the block has failed, and should not be referenced. For
instance, in our supply chain example (§ 2), each block repre-
senting a trade would have to be approved by the consensus
mechanisms tracking the goods involved. Each consensus
mechanism is a consortium of distinct principals, which
agree together to aest to blocks representing supply chain
transactions. Additionally, those consortia might demand
that any block they make a permanent part of the record
must be stored in a certain way. us each block’s label
requires that it be stored in a particular way, and that it be
approved by a particular consensus.
3.1.3 Availability Policies
Within a label, availability policies describe possible sets of
Wilbur servers which must store a block, as well as what
kind of aestation each must provide. One type of policy,
found in our implementation, is a set of acceptable sets of
Wilbur servers, each identied by public key, as well as a
specied format for each server’s aestation.
3.1.4 Integrity Policies
Just as availability policies specify the minimal availability
aestations a block requires, integrity policies specify the
minimal integrity aestations. An integrity aestation is a
statement about what won’t be aested to in the future, so an
integrity policy is likewise a statement about what anyone
who aests to this block shouldn’t aest to later. In short, it
denes the set of blocks which conict with this one.
By specifying conicting blocks, integrity policies specify
the data structures to which a block will belong. If a data
structure is non-exclusive, any block can claim membership:
no integrity policy is required. Many data structures, how-
ever, require exclusivity: admiing some blocks precludes
others. For instance, a chain consists of a series of slots, each
of which may be claimed by only one block. Any two blocks
claiming the same slot on the same chain conict.
Integrity policies must also specify the type of aestation
they require (§ 3.1.1). is may include a proof of work, or,
as in our implementation, a proof of consensus.
3.2 Consensus
For a consensus mechanism to be useful in Charloe, it must
be able to produce a proof of consensus, which is any data
type, veriable to an external observer, demonstrating that
a specic consensus decided on a specic block. In order
for a proof of consensus to make any sense, it must specify
its participants. A reader must be able to determine under
what failure conditions (in terms of which Fern servers might
fail), a contradictory proof of consensus might be forged. A
proof of consensus can thus form an integrity aestation. A
corresponding integrity policy would specify the participants
who must achieve consensus.
In general, we want Charloe blocks to atomically join (or
fail to join) all their data structures together. e integrity
policy should require a single, atomic consensus mechanism
that satises the constraints of all the data structures to
which the block belongs. For example, in our supply chain
application (§ 2), suppose a block details an exchange of
art for bricks. It would be awkward if the data structure
tracking art accepted the block, but not the data structure
for bricks. When two integrity policies are combined into a
single policy, such that all aestations satisfying the unied
policy satisfy both original ones, we call that a meet (§ 4.1).
For consensus-based integrity policies to have a meet, the
consensus mechanism must have a way to bring together
the participants of both sub-policies. is meet consensus
mechanism should only be able to issue contradictory proofs
of consensus when the consensus mechanisms of both sub-
policies are likewise compromised.
One such mechanism, provided in our prototype, is a
byzantine Paxos-based consensus description, where each
data structure dictates quorums required for approval, and
the block can only be approved by a set of Fern servers
including a quorum from each data structure [35]. Other
consensus mechanisms, such as Stellar [46], have a concept
of meet as well. We are not aware, however, of another con-
sensus implementation that creates a proof of consensus.
3.3 Structure of a Reference
Each block reference features the block’s root hash, which
uniquely identies the block. It also includes a set of at-
testations, allowing anyone retrieving the block to know
where the block may be found, how available it is, and which
data structures it is part of. Finally, it features the block’s
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Figure 5. Two blockchains
sharing a block. e label
of the shared block is the
meet of the chains’ labels.
label (§ 3.1.2), and a Merkle proof that the label matches the
root. Figure 4 is a diagram of a block reference.
3.4 Chains
Many Charloe applications, including in our prototype
implementation, will wish to implement a blockchain. A
blockchain, broadly dened, is any path through the block-
web. However, it is convenient to specify a few more qualities
usually implied by blockchains, and a natural way to repre-
sent them in Charloe. is is what we mean by blockchain:
A blockchain can be identied by a unique root block. is
is simply the block in the chain that has no predecessors.
A chain must also have a label representing how blocks in
the chain must be stored, and what aestations are required
for the uniqueness of each block. e natural label to use
is the label of the root itself. us the root satises the
requirements of the blocks in the chain, and whoever issues
aestations for the root acknowledges that the chain exists
when aesting to the root.
Blocks can be in multiple chains. Each block in a chain
references both the previous block and the root of the chain.
It must also have a label that is at least as strong as that
of each of its roots. Integrity labels and aestations can be
application-specic, so it is up to Fern servers to verify that
they understand the labels involved, and have checked their
relative strength. Furthermore, as chains are totally ordered,
a block should specify what position it takes in each chain,
in terms of “distance from the root.” We call this distance a
slot, and integrity aestations for chains vow not to approve
any two block with the same slot on the same chain. Figure 5
features two blockchains sharing a block.
In general, chains do not ll later slots before earlier ones.
A natural representation is to use natural numbers as slots
(number of blocks from root). By requiring each block to
reference its immediate predecessor (and valid references
include aestations that the predecessor is unique), we can
guarantee that earlier slots are lled before later ones.
3.5 Entanglement
Entanglement occurs when dierent applications interact.
Because each block contains a hash that uniquely identies
its ancestry, aempts to change old blocks become harder to
cover up when they have more diverse descendants. If, for
example, many applications’ blocks reference old timestamps
(to show they were created aer a given time), and in turn are
later timestamped, then aer a while, all these applications’
new blocks would be descendants of all these applications’
old blocks. eir chains become entangled. It would be
impossible for an adversary to change the old records of one
application without changing records of all the applications.
3.6 Incentives
Charloe does not specifywhy Fern or Wilbur servers choose
to aest to certain blocks. is is, in general, specic to an
application. For instance, if a company runs a blockchain
for their own use, they may run their own Fern and Wilbur
servers, which operate over all blocks signed by company
soware. It is also possible to run for-pay Fern or Wilbur
servers. For instance, a server might choose only to aest
to blocks that include in their payload a transfer of funds to
the server’s owner (see §5.3 for how one might implement
funding transfers). We hope to see many incentive schemes
implemented in Charloe.
4 Consistency Properties
Most existing blockchains rely on the serializable consis-
tency [54] of their transactions for critical properties [24, 52].
e programming model oered by serializable transactions
has proven aractive to Blockchain users. With no require-
ment for total serialization, Chartloe does not inherently
have this property. However, Charloe can, in general, guar-
antee causal consistency [10, 19, 42]. Furthermore, subgraphs
of Charloe, such as chains described in §4.3, can guarantee
serializable consistency. is is true even for data spanning
multiple such chains.
Moreover, we can demonstrate that, unlike most permis-
sionless blockchains, data structures in Charloe maintain
availability and integrity properties specied in their labels,
reliant only on the Wilbur and Fern servers they trust1. Un-
trusted adversaries can have no eect on them.
4.1 Joins and Meets
To describe Charloe’s consistency properties, it is useful to
consider the possible universes in which the system may be
operating. For our purposes, each universe is characterized
by the set of servers which have not violated their aesta-
tions. For instance, if we are living in a universe where all
the servers have violated their aestations, then none of the
guarantees implied by block labels hold, since no aestations
can be trusted anyway.
Intuitively, availability aestations describe the set of pos-
sible universes under which a block is still available. Like-
wise, integrity aestations describe the set of possible uni-
verses in which no conicting block can be endorsed by
equivalent aestations. For an aestation A, we refer to this
set of universes as α(A).
For instance, if a Wilbur server W1 aests to a block B,
then in all universes whereW1 holds true to its aestation,
1It is possible to specify permissionless data structures in Charloe. In this
case, the notion of who the structure “trusts” is less explicit than in most
permissioned structures.
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B remains available. Likewise, if a Fern server F1 aests to a
block B, then in all universes where F1 is honest, no block
conicting with B will have an aestation from F1.
We consider an aestation to be stronger than another if it
describes a superset of possible universes, and equivalent if
it describes the same set. Conversely, a stronger aestation
fails in a subset of the universes in which a weaker aesta-
tion fails. When a block has multiple aestations, we can
consider their join (unionsq): a compound aestation representing
the universes in which at least one of the aestations holds.
α
(⊔
A
)
:=
⋃
a∈A
α(a)
(sometimes wrien aunionsqa′ := ⊔ {a,a′} for two aestations)
us we consider one set of availability aestationsA stronger
than another set A′ when the join of A is stronger than the
join of A′. Likewise, we consider one set of integrity aes-
tations I stronger than another set I ′ when the join of I is
stronger than the join of I ′.
We can also consider the compound aestation represent-
ing the set of universes where all of the aestations in a set
hold. We call this the meet (u) of the set:
α
(l
A
)
:=
⋂
a∈A
α(a)
(sometimes wrien aua′ := d {a,a′} for two aestations.)
For blocks, we want to consider the set of universes in
which they are both available and no conicting blocks have
equivalent or stronger aestations. For a block B with avail-
ability aestations A, and integrity aestations I :
α(B) :=
(⊔
A
)
u
(⊔
I
)
For instance, suppose Alice and Bob are minting a block
together. ey get availability aestations from Wilbur
serversW1,W2, andW3, and integrity aestations from Fern
servers F1, F2, and F3. In all universes whereW1,W2, orW3
are live and trustworthy, the block will remain available.
Furthermore, so long as F1, F2, or F3 are trustworthy, no
conicting block can get equivalent or stronger aestations.
When we consider α for proofs of work, each universe is
still characterized by the set of trustworthy aestations: in
this case, the set of proofs such that no equal or longer con-
icting proof of work exists. us longer proofs of work are
equivalent to more aestations.
Blocks with a superset of aestations are more available,
or more trustworthy, than other blocks. For instance, sup-
pose block B1 is endorsed by Fern server F1, but block B2 is
endorsed by Fern servers F1 and F2. If F1 is dishonest, then
blocks conicting with B1 might also have F1 aestations: no
client would have reason to prefer B1 over those conicting
blocks. erefore, we say B2 has stronger integrity, because
only when F1 and F2 are dishonest can B2 be contradicted
by a block with equivalent aestations. Note that many at-
testations are incomparable: if B3 has aestations from Fern
servers F2 and F3, then should B2 and B3 conict, Charloe
sets no precedent as to which is “preferable.”
When considering multiple blocks, we can talk about the
set of universes in which both are available and uncontra-
dicted. is is precisely when at least one availability aes-
tation of each features an honest and live Wilbur server, and
at least one integrity aestation for each is from an honest
Fern server. us the meet (u) of a set of blocks B is dened
exactly like the meet of a set of aestations.
Likewise, we can talk about the set of universes where at
least one block is available and uncontradicted. us the join
(unionsq) of a set of blocks B is dened exactly like the join of a
set of aestations.
Join and meet for references are dened exactly as for
blocks. We can even dene α , join, and meet for labels. For
a label `, let R be the set of all possible references featuring
aestations satisfying `:
α(`) := α
(l
R
)
Intuitively, the set of universes in which a label is violated
includes any universe where any reference satisfying that
label is violated. Join and meet are then dened for labels
exactly as they are for blocks and references.
4.2 Causal Consistency
Causal consistency, intuitively, is the requirement that in
any view of a system, if an eect of an event is visible, then
so are the eects of any logical causes of that event [10, 19,
42]. In Charloe, we think of each block as an event, and
each block it references as a logical cause. Each reference
carries aestations that the blocks referenced are available
and approved members of their respective data structures.
e DAG structure of the blockweb guarantees no cyclic
causality. At a very basic level, causal consistency is assured.
However, in Charloe, the notion of event “visibility” is
not so clear-cut. Dierent blocks may have dierent levels
of availability and integrity. When, for instance, one set of
Wilbur servers crash, some blocks may become unavailable,
but not others. erefore, we dene two notions:
• e recursive availability of a block is the availability
of that block, joined with the recursive availability of
the blocks it references. is may be thought of as
the set of circumstances (in terms of which Wilbur
servers hold to their aestations) under which the
block’s entire ancestry is available.
• e recursive integrity of a block is the integrity of
the block, joined with the recursive integrity of each
block it references. is may be thought of as the set
of circumstances (in terms of which integrity aesta-
tions are violated) under which no block is approved,
which conicts with any block in the ancestry.
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us, the causal consistency of any block is assured
precisely when the block’s recursive availability and
recursive integrity hold.
As time goes on, and ancestries of new blocks grow larger,
it may seem that recursive integrity and recursive availabil-
ity of blocks would naturally become weaker. However, each
time a new block is approved, Fern and Wilbur servers may
add new aestations to those it references. In fact, some
applications may specify recursive aestations, which are a
short-hand for listing an aestation for each block in the
given block’s ancestry. For instance, a proof of work aesta-
tion demonstrates that a certain amount of hash-reversing
power is necessary to approve a conicting block. Because
the block contains hash roots of those it references, that
amount of hash-reversing power would also be necessary to
approve blocks conicting with those referenced. Since ad-
ditional hash-power is added each time a new descendant is
minted, it is possible to construct ever-stronger aestations
of old blocks as time goes on.
If an application considers its Fern servers to implicitly
approve a block’s ancestry each time they approve a block,
then a block’s recursive integrity is exactly its own integrity.
Furthermore, if an application stores all elements of a block’s
ancestry in the same way as it stores the block itself, then the
block’s recursive availability is the same as its availability. If
an application does both, then a block’s causal consistency
is assured whenever the block’s labels hold.
Charloe does not have an explicit requirement that all
aestations are recursive in this way, because some applica-
tions may not benet from such a thing (§ 5.4). Furthermore,
some applications may consider some historical blocks more
“important” than other historical blocks. For example, with
the timestamping application (§ 5.4), blocks referencing a
timestamp have all manner of unrelated ancestors, since
timestamp blocks can reference blocks from any application.
For such applications, the relevant consistency properties
will have to do with recursive availability or integrity re-
stricted to the set of blocks they consider important.
Causal consistency alone is sucient for some applica-
tions. However, other applications may want the full serial-
izability provided by traditional blockchains.
4.3 Chain Properties
When a chain is constructed according to §3.4, blocks have
a serializable consistency property [54]. In all universes
specied by the label of the root block of the chain, the
blocks have a serial order dened by their slots. We say that
a property holds up to a label when it holds in all universes
described by that label. erefore, we say that blockchains
are serializable up to the label of the chain.
For every block B, all other blocks sharing a chain with
B are serialized either before B (they are ancestors of B), or
aer B (they are descendants of B). is property holds up
to the meet of the labels of the chains B and the other block
share. at is to say, if B and B′ are both on a chain C , and
Fern servers have not issued two contradictory aestations
for C , then B and B′ are ordered. Since the aestations of
all blocks in a chain are bounded by the chain’s label, the
blocks of a chain are serialized up to the label of the chain.
If a set of blocks share multiple chains, they are serialized
so long as one of the chains they share is serialized. A set of
blocks is serialized up to the join of the labels of the chains
they all share.
4.3.1 Chains as Objects
We can view each chain as a stateful object. Each block
represents achange to that state. At the lowest level, the
object’s state is simply the chain itself, but applications may
parse it to something more useful. For example, a chain
representing an account balance could list balance changes
in each block, and an application might read the account
balance as the sum of all the account changes.
When all the blocks in the chain are available, the object’s
state can be said to be available. erefore the object’s avail-
ability is bounded by the meet of the blocks in the chain,
which is in turn bounded by the label of the chain. e object
is at least as available as the label of the chain indicates.
Likewise, when no aestation has been improperly issued
for a block on the chain (such as if there’s a conicting block
in the same slot), the object’s state is consistent: all readers
will see the same chain. e object’s integrity is therefore
bounded by the label of the chain.
4.3.2 Blocks as Transactions
Each block can be on multiple chains. In this object model,
each transaction reads data from some chains, and writes
data to some chains. We represent each transaction as a
block that is appended to all the chains it reads or writes. In
this model, our design for blockchainswithinCharlotte
corresponds exactly to a serializable, atomic transac-
tion system, a popular programming abstraction [27, 54].
Each block can be seen as “locking” all relevant chains,
forcing all other operations to be scheduled either before
or aer the block. e label of a chain bounds the object’s
availability, and integrity (an object loses integrity if it loses
serializability). In this light, Charloe is a generalization of
distributed, federated object stores [32, 39].
5 Applications
Charloe facilitates more exible application designs than
existing blockchain systems can support. More Charloe
applications are described in Appendix A.
5.1 Simulating Existing Chains
Charloe is generic enough to faithfully emulate almost all
existing blockchains and blockchain-like systems. For in-
stance, one could implement “CharloeBitcoin” with blocks
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featuring the same payload as Bitcoin blocks, and proofs-of-
work as integrity aestations. Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer block
distribution network provides, in eect, very weak availabil-
ity aestations. CharloeBitcoin could hold Wilbur servers
accountable when they do not store blocks properly, since
availability aestations can be used as proof of wrongdoing,
and incentive systems could punish misbehaving servers.
Systems like Iota [56], Nano [38], and Spectre [62] do
not each strictly keep a chain of blocks. Nevertheless, their
block payloads could be formaed as Charloe blocks, and
reference multiple priors.
5.2 Object Model
As discussed in § 4.3, we can think of chains in Charloe
as stateful objects, and each block as an atomic transaction.
e labels of the chains represent availability and integrity
guarantees for the objects. Blocks, in this light, represent
serializable transactions. is can be a helpful model for
Charloe applications.
As in Ethereum, it is possible to place programs and object
state digests in each block. While this is sometimes useful,
it is not always necessary. So long as the application can
derive the state of an object from the payload of blocks on
its chain, and each transaction is a block on all the chains it
reads or writes from, the transactions are serializable.
5.2.1 Supply Chain
Our Supply Chain example application (§ 2) features an ob-
ject for each instance of an organization tracking a type
of commodity. Each block details a transfer of ownership,
creation, or destruction of a commodity. Likely, one would
want to have each block signed by any commodity owners
involved.
When Carol wants to trade coffee to Dave in exchange
for diamonds, they execute an atomic transaction on the
objects maintained by mutually agreeable commodities track-
ers. Suppose these are the Canadian Coee Catalogue (CCC),
and the Danish Diamond Directory (DDD). e transaction
should thus be logged on both the CCC’s object, and the
DDD’s object.
5.2.2 Conicts & Perceived Serializability
Any party wishing to maintain a serializable view of the
world need only commit every transaction it cares about to
its own object, aer examining the transaction’s ancestry
for conicts with known history. For example, suppose that
Carol and the CCC are malicious, and Carol logs many
sales of coffee, citing as her source each time the same
unit, which she purchased only once. Aer Dave logs the
coffee purchase with the DDD, the DDD’s records link
Carol’s coffee purchase with the sale of that coffee to
Dave. Assuming the DDD is appropriately checking the
history of the goods in the transactions it commits, it will
not accept any other transactions featuring a dierent sale
of the same unit of coffee anywhere in their history. From
the DDD’s perspective, that coffee was only sold once. e
serializability safety property is assured, from the DDD’s
perspective. If the CCC aests to other transactions in which
that coffee was sold other times, the DDD simply will not
accept any child blocks of those transactions.
Accepting transactions from untrustworthy sources (like
the CCC) can thus be a danger to liveness. To avoid locking
itself out of potential future transactions (in essence having a
dierent view of coffee history from the other commodities
traders) it is in the DDD’s best interest to share any trans-
actions it knows about, and get other principals to aest to
them. is should not be surprising: spreading the news of
a sale helps to prevent double-selling. For a similar reason,
existing blockchain systems oen gossip blocks between
storage nodes [52]. Charloe provides the means to do so
(servers can submit blocks to other servers, just like anyone
else), but does not bake in any particular gossip requirement.
Applications are free to implement whatever best suits their
needs. Even when a malicious server successfully aests to
two conicting transactions, anyone discovering the two pos-
sesses evidence of duplicitousness, and an incentive system
(such as law enforcement) may be able to limit the damage.
5.3 Banking
Many existing blockchain applications implement currency
transfers, the traditional domain of banks [24, 46, 52, 60].
Charloe’s object model (§ 5.2) provides a natural imple-
mentation for banking. Each bank account is an object, with
a label dictating what Wilbur servers the account owner
trusts to keep the account available, and what servers the ac-
count owner trusts to aest only to non-fraudulent transfers.
e label describes exactly who the account owner trusts to
be a bank. e advantage over traditional banking, however,
is that account owners do not have to place all their trust in
one organization. For example, an account might set its label
to be the meet (§ 4.1) of a label representing an account at
one bank, and a label representing an account at another
bank. en the account can be defrauded only if two banks
are fraudulent (at the expense of losing the ability to make
transactions if either bank crashes). In fact, anyone can pro-
vide Fern and Wilbur servers, and account owners are free
to set whatever label parameters they trust, making it easy
to eectively create new banks.
5.4 Timestamping
While the authenticated DAG structure of the blockweb pro-
vides proof of whether blocks were created before or aer
other blocks, a timestamping service provides evidence of
whether a block was created before or aer a given clock
time. Our timestamping application is an example of an
application outside the Object Model. It can take greater
advantage of Charloe’s decentralized features. In fact, it
does not explicitly form blockchains at all.
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A timestamping server simply issues a signed block stat-
ing the present time, and referencing other blocks as “before
that time.” e timestamp’s availability is set by availabil-
ity aestations, but it needs no integrity aestation. Any
block the timestamp references is, if the timestamper is to
be believed, provably created before that time. Likewise, any
block referencing the timestamp was created aer that time.
Blocks can reference or be referenced by blocks issued by
multiple timestamping servers, to increase the trustworthi-
ness of their timing claims.
5.4.1 Transitivity
Timestamping is transitive. Any ancestors of a timestamp
are before that time, and any descendants are aer it. It is
possible to construct a recursive aestation (§ 3.1.1) for any
ancestor of a timestamp block. e timestamp server aests
that none of them will have as ancestors a timestamp block
with a later time (from the same server).
Each timestamp block may have limited space to reference
all the blocks which want to be timestamped. Blocks willing
to have a slightly later timestamp may agree to be referenced
by another block, in eect a timestamp reseller, which is
then referenced by the timestamp. If applications regularly
arrange for their blocks to be descendants and ancestors of
timestamps (preferably multiple timestamps), then Charloe
as a whole will gather a high degree of entanglement (§ 3.5).
5.4.2 Timestamping Implementation
We implemented our timestamping application on top of 4
Wilbur servers. Each server issues a timestamp block when-
ever it has stored 10 new blocks. It then sends the new
timestamp block to all the other servers. A single client sent
thousands of unique blocks to each server, and we timed how
long it took for each to become the ancestor of timestamp
blocks from at least 3 timestamping servers.
We compare to a more traditional blockchain, which com-
pletely serializes all blocks. is also provides a kind of
timestamping, as each round of consensus includes a time-
stamp endorsed by the participating Fern servers. Indeed,
existing services use existing blockchains as reliable times-
tamps [25, 26, 65]. In our experiment, each block was ap-
proved by a 3-out-of-4 byzantine tolerant consensus, and we
timed how long it took to append each block to the chain:
System Blocks Latency StdDev Xput
Timestamping 9638 0.2502s 0.0772s 229/s
Blockchain 120 2.72s 0.31s 0.37/s
By eschewing traditional blockchain design, our time-
stamping application has signicantly beer throughput and
latency. What’s more, it requires only that the timestamping
servers can reference the blocks being timestamped. ey
do not have to interfere at all with other applications. For
instance, our timestamping service can run on the stor-
age nodes of our object model blockchains, providing
each blockwith timestamps, with nomeasurable slow-
down to the chains. Because our timestamping servers
issue timestamps only when they have enough new blocks,
the slower pace of the chains did slow down the rate of
timestamping.
6 Implementation
We have implemented a proof-of-concept version of Char-
loe, and both timestamping (§ 5.4) and object model (§ 5.2)
applications. We implemented a standard block format and
an API for Fern and Wilbur servers in Apache ri, a
datatype and network API language [4, 61]. ri supports
encoding, decoding, and network communication in a wide
variety of programming langauges [4]. e specication
comprises 473 lines of ri code, excluding comments,
whitespace, and closing braces.
We implemented Wilbur and Fern servers in Haskell [22].
Excluding comments, whitespace, and import statements,
our Wilbur implementation is 597 lines of code. Our Fern
implementation is 1057 lines of Haskell, including machinery
specic to dealing with chains as dened in § 3.4. Each
principal is identied by a 1024-bit RSA X509 certicate [30,
58].
Our Fern servers run a novel consensus algorithm based
on byzantine Paxos [35, 36]. It has two features useful for
Charloe, which we have not found elsewhere:
• It produces a proof of consensus (§ 3.2).
• It has a notion of a consensus specication (an in-
tegrity label), as well as meets and joins (§ 4.1) on
those specications, allowing it to enforce chain prop-
erties with multi-chain blocks (§ 4.3). Intuitively, the
quorums for the meet consensus specication each
feature one quorum from each of the labels’ speci-
cations.
e consensus implementation itself, excluding comments,
whitespace, and imports, is 1796 lines of Haskell.
6.1 Experimental Setup
We ran sample chains on a cluster managed by Eucalyptus [2]
(soware meant to simulate Amazon’s cloud computing in-
frastructure [3]). Each machine has two 8-core Intel Xeon
E5-2690 2.9 GHz CPUs [1]. e servers are connected by 10
GBit Ethernet. Each of our servers was on a separate VM2,
shown in the following table:
Role VM Type Cores RAM
Client m1.large 4 16GB
Fern m1.large 4 16GB
Wilbur m2.xlarge 2 2GB
2VM specications were chosen to t within the resources of our cluster.
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The experiment client mints and submits blocks for all
the chains. Each block is begun as soon as aestations are
available for references to the previous blocks.
Fern servers run a 4-participant consensus tolerating 1
byzantine failure for each chain.
Wilbur servers each store blocks for a specic chain. Each
chain has 4 servers, and blocks must be stored on 3.
6.2 Performance
We ran a series of experiments to demonstrate the viability of
applications using the Object Model (§ 5.2). Each experiment
begins with a root block for each chain. We append a block
to all chains together, 12 times in a row. We repeated this
experiment 10 times for 1, 2, and 3 chains. e mean times
to append each of the 120 blocks are in the following table:
Chains Time (s) StdDev StdErr
1 2.72 0.31 0.03
2 15.7 2.4 0.2
3 196 82 8
While these results are not fast, they are more than su-
cient to demonstrate simple blockchains. We believe much
faster performance is possible with more optimized parsing
and consensus.
6.3 Discussion
We believe much faster implementations of Charloe are
possible with additional engineering eort. Proling reveals
that the current prototype spends a signicant portion of
its CPU time marshaling and unmarshaling data. Our pro-
totype implementation uses the ri marshaling and RPC
system [4, 61]. We created a microbenchmark to test the
relative performance of the similar RPC system gRPC [8]
using Protobufs [9]. For our message sizes, gRPC moves
structured data 20–30× faster; even with no other changes,
a reimplementation based on Protobufs should yield sub-
second multichain transaction times.
Marshaling is a dominant factor in part because our con-
sensus algorithm leads to large message sizes. Fortunately,
these message sizes could be brought down substantially by
removing redundancy. For example, to simplify construc-
tion of proofs of consensus, each message in our consensus
system carries the original proposed value, which does not
need to be retransmied with every message.
Other small improvements, including selecting more com-
pact cryptographic ids and signatures, and representing in-
tegrity labels less verbosely, could improve our implementa-
tion. While Haskell yields concise, clear code, a performance-
oriented implementation might choose dierently.
Unaltered 2 Accounts
serialized
longest chain 6,953,512 24,129,215
speed Bitcoin 3.72 years 12.91 yearsPrototype N/A 12.01 years
parallelized
longest chain 110,787 244,163
speed Bitcoin 21.63 days 47.68 daysPrototype N/A 44.32 days
Figure 6. Payment data from Bitcoin’s rst 200,000 blocks
(We were unable to evaluate our prototype on transactions
of arbitrarily many accounts.)
7 Evaluation
We evaluate the potential eciency savings of Charloe on
a payment network by analyzing rst 200,000 of the real
Bitcoin transaction history [5]. Our measurements are based
on our prototype implementation, which has been tested
running chains in our object model (§ 5.2).
Our Charloe banking model is based on our object model:
each bank account is a chain. is presents some diculty in
direct comparison to Bitcoin, as Bitcoin doesn’t keep track of
money in terms of accounts. Instead, each transaction divides
all its money into a number of outputs, each of which specify
the conditions under which they can be spent (such as need a
signature matching a specic public key. . . ). ese are called
Unspent Transaction Outputs, or UTXOs. Each transaction
species a set of input UTXOs as well, from whence it gets
the money, and provides for each a proof that it is authorized
to spend the money. Each UTXO is completely drained when
it is spent, and cannot be re-used. us the transactions
in Bitcoin form a graph, with transactions as vertices, and
UTXOs as directed edges [52].
In Charloe, transactions need only be approved by the
servers specied by the participants. ese are likely to be a
handful of bank servers (enough to tolerate a small number
of failures), executing a consensus protocol. Paxos-based
protocols, like our implementation, have a 3-message latency
for commit, absent conicting commits. By contrast, Bitcoin
requires at least 6 instances of gossiping blocks through
the entire network to commit securely, and each instance
requires many message sends [52]. With only a few servers
running consensus for each transaction, Charloe would
also consume several orders of magnitude less energy than
a proof-of-work based blockchain [20].
communication / TX energy / TX Machines
3 message sends ∼ 3000000 kJ ∼ 50, 000
6 gossip instances ∼ 30 kJ ∼ 5 / bank
In our Charloe banking model, transfers between two
accounts are simply a block on both chains. erefore, so far
as two sets of nancial transactions don’t interact, they can
operate entirely in parallel. e time it takes to make all the
payments in the dataset is therefore the maximum time it
takes to make the payments corresponding to any single path
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through the payment graph. is path of payments, each
referencing the previous, corresponds to a chain of blocks.
If all transactions are between exactly two accounts, and it
always takes the same amount of time to append a block to
two chains, then the time it takes to make the longest chain,
and thus the time it takes to make all the payments in the
dataset, is proportional to the length of the longest path.
e speed analysis of Charloe’s parallelized versus Bit-
coin’s serialized approaches is in Figure 6. In principle, Char-
loe only needs time to order 1.59% of the transactions Bit-
coin orders. If they commit transactions at the same rate,
our Charloe banking design would take 1.59% of the time
Bitcoin would to complete a group of payments.
However, that assumes each transaction takes the same
amount of time to commit. In Bitcoin, it improves anonymity
and performance to combine many small transfers of money
into big ones, with many inputs and many outputs. How-
ever, in Charloe, more accounts means more servers trying
to achieve consensus. In most consensus implementations,
more participants make consensus substantially slower [40,
50]; our implementation is no exception.
In the American nancial system, all monetary transfers
are from one account to another. Blocks are eectively lim-
ited to two chains each. We can simulate this limitation by
refactoring each Bitcoin transaction as a DAG of transactions
with depth logarithmic in the number of participants (see
Appendix B).
e speed analysis for this construction is in Figure 6,
in the “2 Accounts” column. If Charloe commied trans-
actions at the same speed Bitcoin does, it would take only
3.51% of the time that Bitcoin takes to commit a group of
transactions, even aer refactoring the transactions.
However, Charloe’s transactions need only satisfy the
requirements of the bank accounts involved, allowing them
to specify faster consensus mechanisms. Even with our un-
optimized proof-of-concept implementation, with each chain
running a 4-participant byzantine-tolerant consensus among
its Fern servers, we append a block to two chains in 15.7±0.2
seconds. What took the Bitcoin system 3.72 years would thus
take Charloe 44.32 days, a mere 3.29% of Bitcoin’s time. We
believe that faster consensus implementations are possible,
allowing Charloe to become even more ecient.
8 Related Work
Although the original Bitcoin protocol oers limited support
for smart contracts [52, 59], far more developers have ocked
to Ethereum’s general-purpose platform for communicating
applications [21, 24]. Unlike Bitcoin and Ethereum, however,
Charloe does not constrain all blocks to be in one chain,
leaving applications free of unnecessary serialization, and
free to use less expensive consensus mechanisms.
Charloe is not the rst blockchain project to propose
separating availability and integrity servers. StorJ [68] and
Filecoin [34] separate the notion of the blockchain itself en-
tirely from the data being stored. BigchainDB [47], however,
separates its byzantine-tolerant transaction ordering service
from the underlying storage for those transactions, for which
it uses MongoDB [55]. Charloe takes this one step further,
allowing blocks of arbitrary size (even for le storage) to
be stored on Wilbur servers, without requiring that Fern
servers see whole blocks at all.
Unchained blocks: Several current projects involve adapt-
ing blockchains into non-chain structures. Spectre [62],
Iota [56, 57], and Nano (a.k.a. Raiblocks) [38] are each DAGs
of blocks supporting a cryptocurrency, but are not general
application frameworks.
Several projects endeavor to provide the illusion of a single
chain, while dividing the work amongst several shards. Elas-
tico is a sharded proof-of-work chain which divides miners
into semi-independent shards to be unied each “epoch” [43].
Ethereum is considering ways to shard its workload to han-
dle more throughput [23]. Zilliqa is a sharded blockchain
in testing [63]. It is in many ways like Ethereum, although
it still requires full nodes storing all global state, and each
transaction must be parallelizable across aected shards. All
of these projects rely on a global, proof-of-work based miner
membership scheme, and aempt to distribute work automat-
ically. Charloe allows applications to choose more scalable
storage and consensus schemes, and provides a principled
framework in which dierent chains can interoperate.
Integrity meets: To append a block to multiple Charloe
chains, the new block requires integrity aestations satis-
fying both chains. While it is possible to seek approval for
each separately, this runs the risk that one chain will ap-
prove the block, while the other will approve a conicting
block, leaving the rst chain stuck. Charloe solves this
problem precisely when the integrity policies of both chains
have a meet, or “least upper bound,” which is a new integrity
policy satisfying both (§ 4.1). is concept is akin to the in-
tegrity necessary to write multiple information-ow labeled
objects [51]. e consensus we use in our proof-of-concept
implementation has meets, and so a single consensus for both
chains is run whenever we append a block to two chains,
and the block is approved for both, or neither.
Other systems face the challenge of merging data at dier-
ent integrity levels, with various solutions. Projects building
sharded blockchains discuss strategies for inter-shard trans-
actions, many of which can be used in Charloe [24, 63].
To our knowledge, none have implemented them. Some,
such as Elastico [43], avoid the problem by trusting shards
equally, and focusing solely on a crypto-currency designed
so inter-shard transactions are unnecessary. e interledger
protocol [64] uses a kind of 2–phase commit [13] to atomi-
cally commit a transaction to multiple chains. e advantage
of this technique is that it works for almost any consensus
mechanism on each chain. e disadvantage is that each
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chain must have some way to interpret the special transac-
tions which the protocol uses, and it takes at least two rounds
of consensus on each chain to commit. For these reasons,
such a protocol could be used on Charloe chains, but some-
times more convenient integrity meets may be available.
9 Conclusion
Charloe is a decentralized blockweb, to which anyone can
contribute blocks, servers, and applications. Since each
block’s approval process only has to satisfy the parties in-
volved, no expensive global consensus mechanism is re-
quired. Combined with avoiding unnecessary serialization,
this means Charloe applications can run far faster and
more eciently than their traditional blockchain counter-
parts, while retaining many of the same guarantees. Since
the duties of availability and integrity are separated, more
specialized services can more eciently cater to each.
e extensible format of Charloe blocks allows each
application to use whichever consensus mechanism or avail-
ability aestation it wants. is makes it an ideal framework
in which to build new blockchains, both experimental and
industrial. We plan to release the source code of our proof-of-
concept servers, which we hope will bootstrap the adoption
of the blockweb.
A Additional Applications
A.1 Version Control
Version control systems such as Git [17] already maintain
commits, or versions of the codebase, as a DAG. Each commit
references whatever prior commits it was based on. In Git, a
commit with multiple references is called a “merge.”
ese systems have no inherent limit to who can mint
blocks, or with what predecessors. Two things require agree-
ment:
• Pushing a commit to a server, in which case the server
must choose to accept it, in essence promising to
provide that commit to others, when requested.
• Designating a commit as part of a branch, mutable
names each machine assigns to one commit at a time.
ese two correspond exactly to the aestations of Wilbur
and Fern servers. e former is simply block storage, while
in the laer, branches correspond to aestations (§ 3.1.1).
When a machine aests that one commit is its latest choice
for a branch, that commit must refer to its previous choice.
Each time it assigns a new commit to a branch, it aests
never to assign a dierent commit to that branch, unless this
one is in its ancestry. In fact, while the duties of the two
are usually shared by the same machines (e.g. github [7]),
projects like Git LFS [6] separate along exactly the same
lines as Wilbur and Fern. e advantage of making a version
control system compatible with a larger Charloe blockweb
would be composability. Version control users could use
general-purpose Wilbur storage servers to store code, and
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Figure 7. Converting 4 inputs and 4 outputs to a graph of
2-account transactions.
other applications referencing commits or branches need no
version-control-specic mechanism to do so.
A.2 Medical Records
Several recent blockchain eorts are focused on medical
records [11, 41, 44, 49]. Here again, there is no need for total
serialization of all records. One simple model might be to
make each record an object, maintained by Fern and Wilbur
servers of the patient’s choice. Doctors authorized by the
patient or relevant authorities contribute transactions to the
object. is would mimic the existing USA medical record
system, in which the authoritative record for a patient is kept
by their “primary physician” [16]. e primary physician’s
record-keeping duties would simply be made electronic.
Like our version control example (§ A.1), supervising doc-
tors or hospitals could aest to certain records, indicating
that they were kept properly. is allows automatic en-
forcement of some policies, such as allowing some nurses to
prescribe medication if a doctor signs o on it.
B Bitcoin Transactions in Two Accounts or
Less
In Bitcoin, it is advantageous to combine many small trans-
fers of money into big ones, with many inputs and many
outputs. is improves anonymity and performance. In the
real nancial system of the USA, however, all monetary trans-
fers are from one account to another. ey are all exactly
two chain transactions.
We can simulate this limitation by refactoring each Bitcoin
UTXO as 2 UTXOs, and each Bitcoin transaction as a DAG
of transactions with depth:
dloд2(max(number of inputs, number of outputs))e
To do this, we create
n := 2d
chains, each of which is
d := dloд2(max(number of inputs, number of outputs))e
long. We call these chains C0 through Cn . Original input
UTXO i corresponds to both inputs to the rst transaction
of chain i . Original output UTXO j corresponds to one
output of each of the last transactions from chains j and
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j + 2d−1
)
mod n. For 0 ≤ k < (d − 1), the outputs of the kth
transaction in chain i , called Cik , go to C
i
k+1, and:
C
(i+2j )mod n
k+1
e outputs of Cid go to the UTXOs corresponding with out-
put i , and output
(
i + 2d−1
)
mod n. Each transaction divides
its output values proportionately to the sums of the nal
output values reachable from each of the transaction’s out-
puts. Figure 7 is an example transformation from a 4-input,
4-output transaction to a DAG of depth 2 using all 2-input,
2-output transactions.
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